Tuesday, September 22, 2009

The Transformative Power of Consumocracy

The transformative power of consumocratic law, under current circumstances, does not manifest itself as clearly as it could under some other plausible conditions. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress achieved by consumocratic initiatives over the last decade, a vast regulatory space remains unexplored by them. It may not come as a surprise that new initiatives could induce or accelerate the emergence of revolutionary theories in the field of economics and socio-legal research. Any such initiative would necessarily involve the transparent communication to consumers of information habitually excluded from their sphere of authority.

One exemplar of this potential is given by the possible diffusion, on consumer markets, of information relating to remuneration gaps found in certain sectors of the economy. Nothing inexorably prevents consumer markets from accounting for ideal and real ratios between the highest and the lowest wages paid by a corporation (or a group of corporations) in the production of goods and services. A concern for reducing extreme remuneration gaps may thus be combined with the functioning of a ‘free market’ economy. Through consumer-induced changes in corporate profitability equations, a reduction of wage inequality could be just as ‘legitimate’ as improving the ‘quality’ of products a corporation sells intending to satisfy customers who can freely express their preferences. It is here a matter of generating less inequality through freedom, rather than a traditional case of opposition between equality and freedom. It is also an ironic reversal that one solution to the question of reducing extreme inequalities created by the liberal order finds itself potentially of the same mind.

This clearly runs against the notion that any attempt to deliberately remodel economic inequalities is a hindrance to freedom. At the heart of this deeply-rooted belief beats the idea that a market economy cannot alone bring about a purposeful reduction in economic inequality. Few have expressed this belief as simply as the anti-Keynesian author Ludwig von Mises: “If one wants to do away with inequality of wealth and incomes, one must abandon capitalism and adopt socialism.” (1955: 100). It may be worth noting that if pure egalitarianism is out of reach and, on several counts, undesirable, such a suggestion has little bearing except in drawing nearer to this objective. It is then from this perspective that it is similarly argued, from the Keynesian camp, that the deliberate remodelling of economic inequalities is unthinkable without State intervention: “anti-State egalitarianism remains in all likelihood the most utopian project conceivable” (Brunelle 2000: 31).

And yet, as illustrated above, such dogmas do not hold up to scientific criticism. They moreover lie on another dogma, no less challenged by the potential of consumocratic development, namely that the conditions of production and distribution of wealth must be addressed separately – by the market and the state. It is John Stuart Mill who first clearly stated the basis for the balkanization of the conditions of production and wealth distribution:

“The laws and conditions of the production of wealth, partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional, or arbitrary in them (...) this is not so with the distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like.” (1909: Book II, II.1.1)

Accordingly, with the conditions of production obedient to natural imperatives, only the conditions of wealth distribution would accommodate institutional rearrangement. Despite its questionability, one must recognize along with Hayek that this type of proposition casts the basic justification for State intervention in the pursuit of a modern ideal of distributive or social justice (1960:430). And whether Mill’s argument is accepted or rejected, the proliferation of economic inequality generated within the market economy, aided by some laws, is generally perceived as an irreversible phenomenon in the absence of state-led intervention, coercive or otherwise. In this context, state intervention would be the symptom of the natural conflict between the search for efficiency in the economic order on the one hand, and an egalitarian ideal on the other (Aron: 1969: 47-49). These apparent oppositions do fade away under closer scrutiny to reveal the more flexible nature of economic liberalism.

A consumocratic perspective is central in this inquiry. It ably shows that the alleged incompatibility between the imperative of production and an ideal of distributive or social justice is grounded in a narrow conception of what qualifies as a desirable good in the eyes of consumers, coupled with limited information in relation to that good. For it is in liberty that consumers may enrich their notion of a desirable good to attach an ideal of 'social justice' to it. It appears then that a deliberate remodelling of economic inequalities is thinkable without violating the right to property. More precisely, the redistributive state, through taxation, may be said to contravene the obligation not to ignore a moral constraint (respecting the right to property) in the pursuit of a moral goal (the reduction of inequality). But an appropriate consumocratic scheme could, in principle, pursue the same moral goal without ignoring the same moral constraint.

It follows that the above principles of modern socialism and liberalism may be reconciled through the (personal and institutional) redefinition of what are exchangeable goods. This assertion does not solely relate to the combined search for more freedom (or competition) and equality (or solidarity). It suggests that other seemingly contrary goals, such as greater market freedom and socio-environmental protection, could also merge more easily under consumocratic law – hence the relative success of Rugmark (child protection and schooling), FSC (forestry preservation), Flipper Seal (dolphin friendliness), Green Seal (ozone protection), Fairtrade (wage security), and Equal-Salary (gender pay equity) among popular consumocratic schemes. The further development of these schemes would likely weaken the dualism that traditionally characterizes economic and social regulatory action. Such dualism pervades orthodox regulation discourses at the state level and is evident at the international level in the clear separation of the ILO and the WTO, as well as in the institutional arrangements imagined in order to bring these organisations closer towards a common set of objectives. In other words, the development of consumocratic law invites us to envisage a theoretical and practical departure from dualism to duality in the regulation and understanding of essential economic and social action.

Another major inroad into the domain of transnational governance would subject a number of governmental decisions to consumocratic sanction. This may appear as counterintuitive, since consumocratic influence is in principle limited to the private sphere of market exchanges. The consumocratic influence can nonetheless extend its range through the subjection of targeted corporations and sovereign governments to codes of conduct concerning, at one level, the corporate financing of political parties and, at another level, the national security and foreign policy of states, for instance. Plans designed to encourage the selling of consumer goods produced by corporations that support peace-seeking organisations via corporate financing are incidentally under way.

Sunday, August 02, 2009

Early Beginnings

In 1791, an estimated 300,000 British consumers, mainly led by women, had been involved in what is held to be the first consumocratic initiative recorded by historians. They abstained from consuming sugar produced under conditions of slavery and later came to support “free labour” alternatives. The first anti-slavery initiative was the prelude to what has become an increasingly sophisticated mode of regulating corporate behaviour.

In London and throughout the British Islands, advertisement in support of the “free produce” movement flourished. A typical ad is that of a then sugar refiner: "BENJAMIN TRAVERS acquaints the Publick that he has now an assortment of Loaves, Lumps, Powder Sugar, and Syrup, ready for sale […] produced by the labour of FREEMEN.

To date, environmental protection (also understood as the promotion of future generations’ well-being), decent working conditions, as well as the humane treatment of animals are among the spheres toward which the ethical preferences of consumers appear to be heading. Among the most advanced forms of consumocratic devices are the dolphin-safe, fair-trade, child labour free, and forestry (eco)-labelling initiatives.

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

The Malaise of Modernity?






















I am trying here to examine the capacity of consumers to influence corporate profitability equations (and, plausibly though less directly, governmental decisions) through the consumocratic system, that is,
the regulation system within which corporate behaviour is subordinated to consumer demand functions obeying both logics of self-regarding and other-regarding action. In particular, and in contrast with Charles Taylor’s critique of modernity (The Malaise of Modernity, 1991), it is suggested that such a system may mark the development of modern societies in four notable ways.
First, by inviting the individual to inject ‘meaning’ into the socket of the liberal order itself, and offering an ordering of values in which the sense of indifference is posited below that of social responsibility, prior to choice. Second, by effectively soliciting rational and other-regarding behaviour, while ensuring that instrumental reason does not obligatorily take precedence over finalities on the market place. Third, by giving politically disenchanted consumers the opportunity to exert new authority outside the traditional spheres of consumer influence, generally shaped by a deficient ideology – one under which it is (wrongly) assumed that market mechanisms are inherently guided by the solicitation of consumers' individualistic concerns. Fourth, by concretely challenging the common perception that the failure by the State to correct economic externalities in markets leads to inevitable and undesirable results. It can be shown in effect that a nascent consumocracy is opening original spheres of democratic influence in the field of socio-environmental protection – a state of affairs which may prove critical in the face of the coming social and environmental crisis.

Monday, March 09, 2009

Consumocratic Development


Some potential inroads in the development of consumocracy exhale a certain revolutionary flavour. Gender labelling and (anti) extreme inequality labelling are conceivable market-based schemes amenable to reducing inequalities in the work arena, in spite of an old dogma to the effect that non-state egalitarianism is the “most utopian project that can be conceived”. This regulation mode is otherwise limited by its ability to effectively broaden the signals as to what qualifies as a desirable consumer good (i.e., the supply-side of consumocracy) in addition to solicit less selfish behaviour among consumers (i.e., the demand-side of consumocracy). The process preferences of consumers are also likely to be directed towards those spheres of activity from which the State is withdrawing. Indeed, according to findings from clinical psychology regarding choice and values, individuals appear more sensitive to the risk of losing that which they already enjoy than to the risk of benefiting from something which they do not already enjoy to some extent. In line with these findings, the fear that clearly-defined values of solidarity will disappear (because these same values are losing State support) could in fact surpass the desire to uphold new values of solidarity (in those areas where such spirit is still poorly defined). The popular support for equal health care treatment in some countries, combined with the handing over of certain state functions to the private health care sector, may thus be preparing fertile ground for other consumocratic developments.[1]

For the consumocratic regime, stricto sensu, does not involve direct governmental action, even though States are in a position to require, discourage, and disallow the diffusion of process information by State-sponsored labelling enterprises. It follows that only private-sponsored labelling initiatives encapsulate the true dynamics of consumocratic markets; whereas State-sponsored initiatives first operate under the (enabling) governmental regulation of consumer choice, private-sponsored ones immediately allow for the regulation of societal objects through consumer choice. It is indisputable that consumers benefiting from a State regulation intended to broaden their access to process information can in turn have an impact on the regulation of societal objects. In both cases, once it is established, by state or non-state agents, that consumers ought to be (and will be) given access to process information, consumer choice then becomes the market driving force behind the alteration of targeted production methods. One must acknowledge however that consumers’ potential regulatory power is brought to higher levels when free of State obstruction. The use of the ‘product-process distinction’ by the WTO Appellate Body is but one illustration of State-sponsored interference in the diffusion of process information.

[1] In such an instance, a general code of conduct providing for the conditions under which categories of (relatively poor) people would have access to less expensive medical services would have to be agreed upon by popular and central medical bodies. Clinics in urban areas would then have an incentive, under a renewed ‘social licence to operate’ to abide by the code to the extent that the public and a critical mass of (relatively rich) people would favour a more equitable private health care system. This is not to suggest, to be sure, that the State could or should not support, directly or indirectly, such initiatives.

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

Marmosets Provision Food Altruistically



"Human cooperation is unparalleled in the animal world and rests on an altruistic concern for the welfare of genetically unrelated strangers. The evolutionary roots of human altruism, however, remain poorly understood. Recent evidence suggests a discontinuity between humans and other primates because individual chimpanzees do not spontaneously provide food to other group members, indicating a lack of concern for their welfare. Here, we demonstrate that common marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) do spontaneously provide food to nonreciprocating and genetically unrelated individuals, indicating that other-regarding preferences are not unique to humans and that their evolution did not require advanced cognitive abilities such as theory of mind. Because humans and marmosets are cooperative breeders and the only two primate taxa in which such unsolicited prosociality has been found, we conclude that these prosocial predispositions may emanate from cooperative breeding."

Friday, June 13, 2008

Four Types of Other-Regarding Behaviour

Consumers invited to pay attention to both the final and peripheral attributes of goods may not act solely in accordance with their own interests, but also in accordance with the interests of others. Four types of ‘other-regarding’ behaviour may be elicited through this rapprochement between the spheres of production and consumption.

The first type characterizes consumers as motivated by sympathetic feelings towards wage-earners, vulnerable beings, or future generations. These feelings are sufficient to such consumers to develop an ethical approach to buying, independent of the presence or absence of other mechanisms of justification; in the end, they create their own norm which eventually may or may not be observed by others. These non-individualistic feelings rest perhaps more generally on the altruistic trait that is widely shared among humans. In support of a naturalistic vision of this phenomenon, one may note that this trait is present among other animal species.

A second type characterizes consumers as motivated by a sense of duty. This duty is hardly influenced at all by the culminative outcomes of an individual purchase made as a result of an enlightened choice. Rather, its source is more akin to that which motivates many voters and which consists in anticipating theoretically what the likely results would be if everyone acted in the same fashion (in voting or not voting, in supporting or not supporting a consumarchic system). Following Kant, this duty can be assimilated to a 'categorical imperative'*; it does not respond inevitably to utilitarian reasoning.

A third type characterizes consumers as motivated by the effects of already-established or emerging norms of conditionality – notwithstanding obvious financial constraints. An example of this type would consist in describing the behaviour of consumers who desire to express their altruism on the condition that a critical mass of consumers are doing the same. This egalitarian norm is obviously not without its ties to objectives of efficiency and, more generally, a utilitarian perspective. Similar norms could exert a positive and approving social pressure on ‘other-regarding’ types of consumer action and, as a corollary, a negative and disapproving social pressure on more egoistic patterns of behaviour.

A fourth type characterizes consumers as motivated by a spirit of admonitory justice. This means that people may value the sending of disapproving signs to ‘abusers’ (or the sending of signs of approval to ‘non-abusers’) at least as much as the expression of sympathy towards ‘the abused’. The diffusion of process and peripheral information to consumers provides them with the possibility to express their unease in a context increasingly marked by feelings of powerlessness and disenchantment in the face of tutelary or corporate power. For the firms involved on a competitive market, such warnings and approvals take the form of increased or decreased market share.
* One may here recall Kant’s categorical imperative: "Act only according to a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" or "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law".

Sunday, April 20, 2008

On the Societal Value of Goods

Increasing the level of transparency in the transmission of process information to consumers may involve sharing new information on processes either partially exposed or not yet exposed through societal marketing. This could take the form of a novel (or more detailed) social label or webpage on popular ‘fair trade’ themes such as the protection of vulnerable workers, animals, and some eco-systems. Less predictable themes include the reduction of extreme remuneration disparities, gender labelling, and other concerns which do not traditionally belong to the sphere of consumer influence. In a preconsumarchic setting, the latter are usually seen as sensitive issues to be (pre-eminently) examined by States. They are traditionally alien to the motivational foundations of commodity markets. In a consumarchic setting, they may reach individuals through the diffusion of societal information. The type of commodity value which is emphasized as a result may be referred to as the 'societal value' of goods.